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Within-subject data from sequential social dilemma experiments reveal a correlation of first-
and second-mover decisions for which two channels may be responsible, that our experiment 
allows to separate: i) a direct, preference-based channel that influences both first- and 
second-mover decisions; ii) an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence 
beliefs via a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these 
beliefs. We find strong evidence for the indirect channel: beliefs about second-mover 
cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond 
to stated beliefs. But when first movers know the true probability of second-mover 
cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first 
moves, suggesting that the direct channel also plays a role. 
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In social dilemmas, both preferences and beliefs drive players' behavior. Preferences are important
in the sense that individuals dier in what disposition toward cooperation they have, or what their
attitude vis- a-vis other individuals is more generally. But what people believe others will do clearly
matters as well. A person may generally have a very positive individual attitude toward, say,
cooperation in a team, but { if she thinks that other people will shirk regardless of the eort she
puts into the joint project { she may well shirk herself.
Behavioral economic theory oers a wide range of models that predict how actions in social
dilemmas will vary for people with dierent types of (social) preferences and what an individual's
best response is for a given set of beliefs. While these models broaden the spectrum of preferences
that people may hold, they typically stick to the standard assumption that people hold correct
beliefs (in equilibrium). The risk with this approach is to miss a crucial point: how likely a person
thinks it is that others will shirk in a social dilemma may well depend on her own attitude toward
cooperation. As such an interaction of preferences and beliefs is of general importance for decision
making in games, the topic appears to be strangely underdeveloped in the economic literature.
The signicance of this issue is underlined by recent ndings from sequential social dilemma
experiments.1 The data show that subjects who defect as rst movers are more likely to exploit
rst-mover cooperation in their second-mover choice, whereas those who cooperate as rst movers
are more likely to reciprocate rst-mover cooperation. Blanco et al. (2007) have shown this for the
sequential prisoners' dilemma.2 Altmann et al. (2008) and G achter et al. (2008) have a similar
result for the trust game and for a sequential voluntary contribution game, respectively.
The observed within-subjects correlation of the rst and the second move is provocative in several
ways. First, as noted by Blanco et al. (2007) and Altmann et al. (2008), the nding is at odds with
prominent social preference models that are frequently invoked for explaining behavior in social
dilemma games. Both inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) and
reciprocal preferences (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) { under standard assumptions, including
1Earlier experimental analyses of sequential social dilemmas include the sequential prisoners' dilemma (Bolle and
Ockenfels 1990, Clark and Sefton 2001), the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al. 1993), the trust or investment game
(Berg et al. 1995), the lost wallet game (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000), and public-good games with a front runner
(G achter and Renner 2007, Potters et al. 2007).
2Blanco et al. (2007) check for the within-subjects correlation of six dierent moves in four dierent games. The
correlation of the rst and the second move (given rst-mover cooperation) in the sequential prisoners' dilemma was
the strongest among all 15 correlations.
1that beliefs are not correlated with the model parameters { would predict a negative correlation of
rst- and second-mover choices, and not the positive correlation observed.
Similarly, for simultaneous-move prisoners' dilemma experiments, it has been argued that \fear"
and \greed" are the main driving forces of behavior (Ahn et al. 2001, Simpson 2003). Fear refers
to the risk of being exploited by the other player when cooperating. Greed describes a player's
willingness to defect if the other player cooperates. The sequential prisoners' dilemma separates
the two motives: fear applies to the rst move and greed to the second move. Thus, the correlation
of rst and second moves suggests that fear and greed are correlated at the individual level. But it
does not seem evident why greedy people should be more fearful.
More fundamentally, following standard game-theoretic arguments, rst-mover choices should
follow a \best respond to your beliefs" principle3, and hence reect the natural variation in beliefs
across subjects in an experiment. Second-mover choices, in contrast, are simple decision problems
and should depend on players' preferences only. Thus, one would not expect the choices of a person
in the role of rst and second mover to be strongly related to each other { unless beliefs and
preferences are correlated.
A correlation between preferences and beliefs may, however, be exactly what drives the correlation
between rst-mover and second-mover decisions. The so-called consensus eect, according to which
players' beliefs are biased toward their own type, would suggest that those subjects who cooperate
as second movers will expect a higher second-mover cooperation rate among others than those
subjects who defect as second movers.4 The former hence will perceive a higher expected payo
from cooperating as rst mover than the latter. So, all else equal (that is, if there is no relation
between preferences for cooperation in the role of rst and second mover), second-mover cooperators
should be more likely than second-mover defectors to cooperate as rst mover.
One response to the above issues raised by the experimental data is to turn to more intricate social
preference models, that are consistent with the observed correlation of choices without assuming
systematic dierences in beliefs across players. A combination of eciency concerns with maximin
preferences (Charness and Rabin 2002), rule consequentialism (Kranz 2009), and reciprocal altruism
3For recent experiments investigating this issue see, for example, Dhaene and Bouckaert (2007), Costa-Gomes and
Weizs acker (2008), Rey-Biel (2009), and Koch et al. (2009).
4In the social psychology literature this eect is commonly referred to as \false consensus eect" and is well-
established there (see Mullen et al. 1985). The label \false" is, however, misleading because such beliefs are in
principle consistent with Bayesian updating (see Dawes 1989), hence \consensus eect" is a more appropriate term.
See Engelmann and Strobel (2000) for experimental evidence that people exhibit a clear consensus eect, but no truly
\false" consensus eect.
2(Levine 1998) are among the alternatives that can explain why rst-mover decisions dier between
second-mover cooperators and second-mover defectors, even if they hold the same beliefs. These
theories thus presume a direct, preference-based channel that inuences both rst- and second-mover
behavior. The consensus eect, in contrast, suggests an indirect channel that links preferences (as
reected in a person's second-mover decisions) to the rst-mover decision via beliefs. But what is
the right approach?
The issue of indirect versus direct channel seems particularly relevant because the consensus ef-
fect has emerged already in other settings as a plausible alternative to preference-based explanations
in rationalizing certain patterns of behavior. For instance, dictator- and trust-game studies where
participants report what they believe their counterpart expects in the game, show signicant corre-
lations between these second-order beliefs and actions. An explanation for this pattern is that some
people are guilt averse, that is, they experience a utility loss if they believe to let someone down
(Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). But Ellingsen et al. (2009) conclude from their own experiments
that the correlation can almost exclusively be attributed to a consensus eect. When subjects are
informed about their counterpart's rst-order belief, this belief has almost zero correlation with own
behavior. Such a correlation would, however, be required for the preference-based (guilt-aversion)
explanation.
The purpose of our experiment is to deepen the understanding of the patterns of interaction
between preferences and beliefs with the help of a sequential prisoners' dilemma (SPD) design
(Bolle and Ockenfels 1990, Clark and Sefton 2001).5 Specically, our experimental setup renes
the handling of subjects' beliefs to disentangle the channels through which preferences and beliefs
jointly determine actions in a sequential social dilemma. We have the following three treatments
and main ndings:
{ Baseline (where we do not elicit beliefs) replicates the correlation of rst and second moves
previously observed.
{ Elicit Beliefs adds an incentivized belief-elicitation stage. We nd that rst movers over-
whelmingly play the (selsh) best response to their stated beliefs about second-mover be-
5Our analysis should also apply to the other sequential social dilemmas mentioned above. The sequential prisoners'
dilemma shares fundamental properties with, for example, the investment game and the gift-exchange game in that
Pareto gains are possible, but that initiating the trade exposes the rst mover to risk. In our game, there are eciency
gains from cooperation both at the rst stage and at the second stage. The investment game has eciency gains only
at the rst stage (the pie size does not increase further if the second mover returns money), whereas the gift-exchange
game (and some \trust games" in the literature) only has eciency gains at the second stage.
3Figure 1: Channels through which rst- and second-mover decisions are potentially related
havior. At the same time, beliefs are biased toward a subjects's own second-mover choice.
Eliciting beliefs does not make the correlation of the two moves in the SPD go away, and the
elicited beliefs are consistent with an explanation based on a consensus eect.
{ In True Distribution, we give as feedback the actual frequency of second-mover cooperators,
before subjects decide their rst move. Here, too, most subjects do best respond. But the
second move still has predictive power for the rst move. This suggests that rst-mover
behavior is not just a selsh best response to beliefs about second movers, but also depends
on a general inclination to cooperate in the SPD.
Figure 1 illustrates these ideas. Elicit Beliefs allows to identify whether there is a consensus eect
(a correlation between beliefs and second-mover decision) and whether players best respond to their
beliefs. This treatment, however, does not rule out the direct channel, and neither does it permit to
distinguish between the direct and the indirect channel. For this purpose, True Distribution gives
feedback about the protability of rst-mover cooperation that is not inuenced by a participant's
own second-mover choice. It thereby shuts down the indirect channel, and makes it possible to
separate the explanatory power of the direct channel from the indirect eect of second-mover choice
via expectations.
42 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 Design
Our design is based on the sequential prisoner's dilemma game in Figure 2. There are two players,
the rst mover (FM) and the second mover (SM), who each face an action choice whether to
cooperate or defect (a 2 fc;dg). If aFM = d, the game ends with a payo of 10 for both rst
mover and second mover.6 If aFM = c, the payo depends on the action of the second mover.
The second-mover decision is thus conditional on the rst mover choosing to cooperate. Following
aSM = c, payos are 14 for both rst and second mover; following aSM = d, the payo is 7 for the
rst mover and 17 for second mover.
We are interested in the impact of beliefs on choices in the sequential prisoners' dilemma. With
repeated play, beliefs become confounded with experience. In order to keep this apart, our experi-
ment is one-shot; subjects make each choice exactly once.
All subjects decide in both the rst- and the second-mover role. They rst decide as the second
mover and then as the rst mover. (As will become clear below, our design requires this very
order of decisions.) We use the so-called strategy-elicitation method with role uncertainty. After
participants have made their decisions, they are randomly assigned roles and are randomly matched
into pairs, and payos are calculated according to the relevant decisions of the participants.
Our treatments are designed to explore how beliefs and actions are related, and whether variation
in rst-mover behavior is completely captured by dierences in beliefs. Specically, our treatments
are as follows (see also Table 1). Baseline is our point of departure. In this treatment, we neither
elicit beliefs about second-mover cooperation nor do we give feedback on the true frequency of
second-mover cooperation. In Elicit Beliefs, participants have to guess how many of the nine other
participants in the session cooperate as second movers. This \guess task" is performed between
second- and rst-mover decisions, and is incentivized. In True Distribution, before subjects decide
in the role of the rst mover, they are informed about the actual number of second-mover cooperators
among the nine other participants in the session.
Three specic design issues deserve further comment. First, in order to keep the number and
nature of decisions as symmetric as possible across treatments, we introduced a belief-elicitation
6In their sequential prisoner's dilemma experiments, Bolle and Ockenfels (1990), Clark and Sefton (2001), and
Blanco et al. (2007) nd that 95, 96, and 94 percent, respectively, of the second movers defect when the rst mover
defects. Given this near unanimity, we dropped this decision to simplify the experiment and implement payos as if




















SM payoff: πSM(aFM, aSM)
Figure 2: Sequential prisoner's dilemma game
task also in Baseline and in True Distribution. In these treatments, participants have to make
a guess about the other participants' rst move. As beliefs about the rst-mover choices of other
participants should not aect decisions in the SPD, this belief-elicitation task serves only the purpose
of keeping the design balanced across treatments.
Second, we conducted pilot sessions of the True Distribution treatment which diered slightly
from the variant we nally used. While written instructions were identical, in the nal design, the
oral summary emphasized the feedback on the true distribution of second mover choices. The data
from the pilot sessions suggested that stronger emphasis of the feedback's relevance is warranted.7
Third, when both the payo from playing the game and the belief-elicitation task are paid (as
7In the pilot sessions, subjects were told that at this stage \[a]ll participants in the room did the above Decision
Task B. Now you will be informed about how many of the nine other participants in the room chose LEFT in Decision
Task B." This summary seemed too brief, as feedback did not have a signicant impact on rst-mover cooperation
rates. In the nal design, the oral summary therefore included additionally: \Note that if you are assigned the role
of Person A, one of these nine choices is the choice of the person you will be matched with. This means, for example,
that if the information is that nine out of nine chose LEFT, then you know for sure that you will be matched with a
person B who chose LEFT ... " The oral summary continued with other examples (see the Appendix for instructions
and oral summaries).
6Baseline Elicit Beliefs True Distribution
Task 1 2nd move 2nd move 2nd move
Feedback (aSM
 i ) no no yes
Task 2 1st move beliefs (aSM
 i ) 1st move
Task 3 beliefs (aFM
 i ) 1st move beliefs (aFM
 i )
# Participants 40 60 60
Table 1: Treatments.
is commonly done in economics experiments), subjects can use the stated beliefs to hedge against
risks of their decisions. This may bias decisions or stated beliefs. In Blanco et al. (2008) we address
this methodological issue in detail. To test for such an eect, we pay for both the decisions and the
beliefs in three of the six Elicit Beliefs sessions, whereas in the remaining three sessions, we pay
for either the belief or the decision (both with equal probability). The last procedure removes the
hedging opportunities. As this test is not related to the purposes of the present paper, we note here
only that the method of payment causes no signicant dierences, and refer the reader to Blanco
et al. (2008) for details. Indeed, the results are virtually identical, and we therefore pool the data
from the Elicit Beliefs sessions.
For the belief elicitation task (\guess task"), we use a quadratic scoring rule.8 Specically, we
ask subjects how many of the nine other participants in the lab cooperate in the role of second
mover, and reward the accuracy of this stated belief using the quadratic scoring rule








where di is the dierence between player i's guess and the correct number of second-mover coop-
erators in the session. Large deviations from the correct guess thus are penalized more heavily
than small deviations. An accurate guess of how many of the other nine participants in the session
chose to cooperate yields a payo of 15. Rather than using the above formula in the experimental
instructions, the reward for the accuracy of the guess (rounded to multiples of 0.1) is presented to
the participants as in Table 2.
8This is the most common belief elicitation method. See, for example, Bhattacharya and Peiderer (1985), Holt
(1986), Selten (1998), Huck and Weizs acker (2002). The quadratic scoring rule is incentive compatible for risk-neutral
individuals (for example, Murphy and Winkler 1970, Savage 1971). For other scoring rules, see Allen (1987), Oerman
et al. (2009), Karni (2009) and Schlag and van der Weele (2009).
7True numbera
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
9 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3 5.9 3.1 0.0
8 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3 5.9 3.1
7 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3 5.9
6 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4 8.3
Guessb 5 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0 10.4
4 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3 12.0
3 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3 13.3
2 5.9 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8 14.3
1 3.1 5.9 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0 14.8
0 0.0 3.1 5.9 8.3 10.4 12.0 13.3 14.3 14.8 15.0
Notes:
a the true number of a
SM = c choices among the nine other subjects;
b the stated belief about the number
of a
SM = c choices among the nine other subjects. Payos are based on the quadratic scoring rule in (1).
Table 2: Payo table for the belief elicitation task.
The experiments use a neutral frame. We relabelled players and actions as follows: FM=A player,
SM=B player, FM cooperate=IN, FM defect=OUT, SM cooperate=LEFT, SM defect=RIGHT.
Payo units were called experimental currency units (ECU).
2.2 Procedures
The experiments were carried out computer based with the experimental software z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007) in the Experimental Laboratory of Royal Holloway, University of London. Par-
ticipants were students from various disciplines, recruited through online and on-campus advertise-
ments.
We conducted 16 sessions with ten participants each (that is, a total of 160 participants). Because
the experiment is one-shot, each participant provides an independent observation. There were four
sessions for Baseline, and six sessions each for Elicit Beliefs and True Distribution (see Table 1).
The payment to subjects is either the payo from playing the SPD game or the payo from
the belief-elicitation task, with the exception of three Elicit Beliefs sessions where both tasks were
paid (as explained above this was done in order to check for hedging confounds). To be precise, a
random computer draw at the end of the experiment decides which of the two tasks are paid, both
8being equally likely. To make the possible payos from each task approximately equal, we set the
scoring factor for the belief-elicitation task to 15 in (1). The nal payout in experimental currency
units (ECU) was converted into Pounds Sterling at an exchange rate of $1 per ECU (in the three
Elicit Beliefs sessions where both tasks were paid, the exchange rate was $0.5 per ECU to keep a
similar level of earnings as in the other sessions).
In the beginning of each session, participants read through the instructions, followed by a control
questionnaire that required them to solve simple examples on how actions determine payos. Any
questions were answered privately. Prior to each task there was an oral summary. (Instructions and
the oral summaries are reproduced in the Appendix.) That is, when all participants had nished
the control questionnaire, an oral summary for the rst task was given; when all had nished the
rst task, the next task was summarized, etc.
Participants were informed that, after all tasks were completed, they would be randomly assigned
a role (that is, rst mover or second mover) and would be randomly paired with a participant in the
room that was assigned the opposite role. They also knew that, as a consequence of this procedure,
at the moment of making their decisions they would not know their own role or their co-player's
decision.
3 Theoretical Background
How would a rational and selsh agent play our sequential prisoners' dilemma (SPD) game from
Figure 2? Clearly, as the second mover, she would always defect. Thus, in the rst-mover role, if
she knows that the second mover is rational and selsh, she will defect as well. This implies that
the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for two selsh players (with the rst mover knowing
about the second mover's selshness) in our experimental setup is aSM = d, aFM = d.
It is, however, well documented that second movers often cooperate in social dilemma situations
(for example, see Clark and Sefton 2001). Given this possibility of second-mover cooperation, the
rst-mover decision whether or not to cooperate is no longer trivial { even for a selsh player { but
depends on the player's belief about the probability that she is matched with a second mover who
cooperates. In our SPD game, aFM = c is a best response for a selsh rst mover if and only if the
belief about the frequency of second-mover cooperation is at least 3=7 ( 43 percent).
What implications may non-selsh preferences have in our game? Suppose rst that players
are rational but inequality averse (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Second
movers who dislike advantageous inequality will be reluctant to exploit rst-mover cooperation.
9Aversion to advantageous inequality thus can explain second-mover cooperation. (In terms of Fehr
and Schmidt's (1999) model, a player will choose aSM = c if and only if the parameter measuring
her disutility from advantageous inequality is greater than 0.3.) For the rst move, aversion to
disadvantageous inequality implies that inequality averse players are less inclined to cooperate than
selsh players (holding xed the belief about second-mover cooperation). The reason is that un-
reciprocated rst-mover cooperation causes disadvantageous inequality. In other words, a rational,
inequality averse rst mover requires a more optimistic belief than a selsh one to still play aFM = c.
Thus, when advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aversion are positively correlated, as Fehr
and Schmidt (1999, p. 864) argue is plausible, their model predicts a negative correlation of rst-
and second-mover cooperation (given the standard assumption that beliefs do not systematically
vary with preferences).9 Similarly, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, p. 182-3) argue that inequality
averse players will more likely be defectors as rst movers in the SPD and cooperators as second
movers, relative to selsh players.
Can reciprocal preferences (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) help explain the positive correla-
tion typically found in the data? A suciently reciprocal player will cooperate as second mover in
the SPD. As a rst mover, a reciprocal player is more inclined to cooperate than a selsh player if
her belief about the second-mover cooperation probability is greater than 1/2, and less inclined to
cooperate if her belief is less than 1/2. Given our parameters, the predicted rst-mover behavior of
a player with any degree of reciprocity coincides with that for a selsh player for all beliefs, except
for the stated belief that four out of nine second movers in the session are cooperating. In this
case, a selsh rst mover will cooperate, whereas a suciently reciprocal player will defect. Thus,
according to the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger model, if there is any correlation at all, it should be
negative (assuming again that beliefs are independent of preferences).
We now turn to total surplus or eciency considerations, which have been shown to be relevant in
distribution experiments (Charness and Rabin 2002, Engelmann and Strobel 2004). Eciency gains
occur at both stages of the SPD. Hence, a player who cares suciently strongly about eciency
would cooperate at both stages, and this would lead to a positive correlation of moves. But, a
model based on total surplus considerations would also predict unconditional cooperation by second
movers, which usually is rejected in the data (see footnote 6).
A number of models, however, are consistent both with conditional second-mover cooperation
and a positive correlation of rst and second moves. Conditional cooperation can result if eciency
9Based on the empirical evidence in Blanco et al. (2007), who nd no signicant correlation in their within-subjects
estimates of Fehr and Schmidt parameters, the model would predict no correlation of rst- and second-mover choices.
10concerns are combined with maximin preferences, as in Charness and Rabin (2002), because in con-
trast to cooperating after rst-mover defection, cooperating after rst-mover cooperation increases
not only the total but also the minimum payo. The more elaborate version of Charness and
Rabin's (2002) model that includes concern withdrawal { that is, a reduced weight in the utility
function on the payos of players who \misbehave" { provides even stronger support for conditional
cooperation.
Kranz's (2009) model of rule consequentialism also combines concerns for own payo and ef-
ciency. Some players (so-called compliers) are assumed to care about complying with a moral
norm that maximizes social welfare. Even if the selsh types get full welfare weight, a rule-
consequentialistic norm can prescribe compliant second movers to only conditionally cooperate.
The reason is that selsh rst movers get incentives to cooperate if it becomes commonly known
that there is a norm of conditional but not unconditional cooperation. Furthermore, compliers are
more likely to cooperate as rst movers than selsh players: since compliers suer a disutility when
they deviate from the norm of rst-mover cooperation, the threshold belief for which cooperation
is a best response is lower than the one relevant for a selsh rational player.
Finally, in Levine's (1998) model, own altruism interacts with a player's estimate of the other's
altruism. Given the same (suciently optimistic) beliefs about the second mover's altruism, an
altruistic player is more likely to cooperate as rst mover than a selsh one. A more altruistic
player is also more likely to cooperate as second mover. But since rst-mover defection signals
low altruism of the rst mover, cooperation after rst-mover cooperation is more likely than after
rst-mover defection.
Could variation in risk preferences explain a correlation between rst- and second-mover deci-
sions? As second-mover decisions involve no risk, this would require risk tolerance to be positively
related to second-mover cooperation. Burks et al. (2009) indeed nd an indirect relation between
these two variables: cooperative behavior increases and risk aversion decreases with higher cognitive
skills in a subject pool constituted of trainee truckers. But in our setting, for typical degrees of risk
aversion, risk preferences can only explain variation in rst-mover behavior for subjects with a belief
that four out of nine second movers cooperate. A relation between preferences for cooperation and
for risk thus would predict no (or only a moderate) positive correlation in rst- and second-mover
behavior in our experiment.
As discussed in Section 1, the consensus eect oers a plausible alternative explanation for the
positive correlation of rst- and second-mover choices. A consensus eect is said to occur when
players hold a belief that is biased toward their own preference or choice. If players' beliefs about
11Baseline Elicit Beliefs True Distribution Total
rst mover (FM) 27.5% 55.0% 56.7% 48.8%
second mover (SM) 55.0% 53.3% 55.0% 54.4%
Table 3: Average cooperation rates by treatment.
second-mover behavior are subject to a consensus eect and if their rst-mover choices are best
responses to their beliefs, this means that they are more likely to cooperate as rst movers provided
they cooperate as second movers.10
To summarize, the possible explanations for the positive correlation of rst- and second-mover
decisions typically observed in sequential social dilemma games fall into two camps. The consensus
eect which predicts an indirect link between preferences and rst-mover decisions (because beliefs
are biased toward one's own type), and other explanations that predict a direct link between rst-
mover decisions and underlying preferences (that is, they should operate even if beliefs are held




We begin with a brief overview of the cooperation rates in our experiments. Overall, 49 percent of
the rst movers and 54 percent of the second movers cooperate. As Table 3 shows, cooperation rates
do not dier much across treatments, with the exception of rst movers in Baseline. In Baseline,
fewer subjects cooperate as rst movers than in each of the other treatments, and we reject the
hypothesis that all three cooperation rates are the same (2 = 8:314; d:f: = 2; p = 0:016).11 We
will return to this issue below.
At the treatment level, rst-mover cooperation is a risk-neutral best response, because the second-
mover cooperation rate exceeds the threshold of 3=7  43 percent. Hence, cooperation is the rst-
10Obviously, a consensus eect does not explain why some second movers cooperate in the rst place. Thus even if
the correlation between rst- and second mover choices is best explained by a consensus eect, a complete explanation
of the data will require some preference element that rationalizes second-mover cooperation.
11All chi-square statistics reported in this paper are Yates corrected. The pairwise comparison of rst-mover
cooperation Baseline with Elicit Beliefs and True Distribution yields 
2 = 6:292; d:f: = 1; p = 0:012 and 
2 =
7:113; d:f: = 1; p = 0:008, respectively.
12aFM aSM Baseline Elicit Beliefs True Distribution Total
Same choice as rst and second mover aFM = aSM
c c 10 (25.0%) 27 (45.0%) 23 (38.3%) 60 (37.5%)
d d 17 (42.5%) 22 (36.7%) 16 (26.7%) 55 (34.4%)
Sum 27 (67.5%) 49 (81.7%) 39 (65.0%) 115 (71.9%)
Dierent choices as rst and second mover aFM 6= aSM
c d 1 (2.5%) 6 (10.0%) 11 (18.3%) 18 (11.3%)
d c 12 (30.0%) 5 (8.3%) 10 (16.7%) 27 (16.9%)
Sum 13 (32.5%) 11 (18.3%) 21 (35.0%) 45 (28.1%)
Total 40 (100%) 60 (100%) 60 (100%) 160 (100%)
Table 4: Distribution of individual choice pairs by treatment.
mover choice that maximizes expected payos in all treatments. This does not hold in all individual
sessions though, and we examine below the individual subjects' best responses.
Crucially for our research question, we nd that most subjects make the same choice as rst and
as second movers, similar to the results in Blanco et al. (2007). Table 4 shows that, of the 160
subjects participating in all treatments, 60 (38%) cooperate in both roles and 55 (34%) defect in
both roles. Only 27 subjects (17%) defect as rst movers and cooperate as second movers, while
the remaining 18 subjects (11%) cooperate as rst movers and defect as second movers. We will
see below that, depending on the treatment, the correlation of moves has dierent magnitudes and
dierent meanings. Nevertheless, we emphasize at this point that overall 72 percent of our subjects
make the same decisions in the two situations.
4.2 The Baseline treatment
Our Baseline treatment is the starting point of the analysis and establishes the aforementioned
correlation of rst- and second-mover choices. We nd a signicant phi correlation coecient of
 = 0:388 (2 = 6:030; d:f: = 1; p = 0:014). In the SPD of Blanco et al. (2007), the correlation is
of a similar magnitude as the one we obtain here ( = 0:433). To sum up our ndings on Baseline:
Result 1 In Baseline, the rst and second move are positively correlated.
134.3 The Elicit Beliefs treatment
In Elicit Beliefs, subjects have to guess how many of the other nine participants are cooperators,
before making their rst-mover choice. Eliciting beliefs is not necessarily innocuous as it may aect
behavior (see, for example, Croson 2000). It focuses subjects on thinking about the likelihood of
second-mover cooperation by others and could thus change (best-response) rst-mover behavior that
is decided upon after the belief-elicitation stage. In particular, this could increase the correlation
between rst and second moves if it is driven by a consensus eect.
Indeed, we nd a signicant increase in rst-mover cooperation rates relative to Baseline (see
Section 4.1). Supercially, this looks like contradicting Croson (2000), where cooperation decreases.
But in her experiments it is a dominant strategy not to cooperate, whereas in our setting rst-mover
cooperation is a best response, given the average second-mover cooperation rates in Baseline and
Elicit Beliefs.12
Regarding the correlation of behavior in Elicit Beliefs, 49 of 60 (81.7%) subjects make the same
choice as rst and second movers (27 subjects cooperate at both stages). The correlation of choices
is signicant ( = 0:598; 2 = 21:431; d:f: = 1; p < 0:001) and even stronger than in Baseline.
That is, the belief-elicitation procedure itself tends to strengthen the correlation of moves. This
is in line with a consensus eect explanation. Finally, belief elicitation does not aect the second-
mover cooperation rates (see Section 4.1), as expected because these are decided on before the belief
elicitation stage.
What are the stated beliefs like then? Figure 3 shows the histogram of stated beliefs based on
the aFM choice. It reveals a clear and strong nding: the two belief distributions are signicantly
dierent (two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, D = 0:670, p < 0:001). Subjects who choose
aFM = d are much more pessimistic about the number of second-mover cooperators (mean belief
2.7) than those who choose aFM = c (mean belief 6.2). Moreover, the rst-mover action and the
stated belief are strongly correlated (rank biserial correlation rrb = 0:864; t = 13:074; p < 0:001).
These results show that the relation between beliefs and rst-mover behavior is as standard economic
logic suggests.
Considering aSM choices and beliefs, we nd a similar correlation (rrb = 0:808; t = 10:447; p <
0:001), and the dierence between the distributions of beliefs of aSM = c and aSM = d players again
is signicant (D = 0:768, p < 0:001). This is consistent with a consensus eect.
12In general, the evidence on the eects of incentivized belief elicitation is mixed. For example, in a public goods
game G achter and Renner (2006) nd an increase in contribution rates { in contrast to Croson (2000) { and in a trust











0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 3: Histogram of stated beliefs (treatment Elicit Beliefs)
Figure 3 also reveals that almost all rst movers best respond to their belief. Recall that aFM = c
is the (selsh) best response for a risk-neutral payo maximizer if and only if her belief is at least
3=7  43 percent. That is, if a risk-neutral player believes that there are four or more aSM = c
players in the session, she should choose aFM = c. Almost all rst-mover choices are consistent with
this. Specically, all 13 subjects who believe they are in a session with seven or more second-mover
cooperators do cooperate themselves as rst movers, and all 17 subjects who believe they are in
a sessions with three or fewer second-mover cooperators defect as rst movers. For ten (out of
60) subjects, the stated belief is inconsistent with selsh risk-neutral payo maximization (they all
choose aFM = d). A moderate amount of risk aversion can explain the majority of these deviations.
Six of the subjects state a belief of 4/9. For this belief aFM = d is a best response with CRRA-utility
in the empirically relevant range for the risk aversion coecient of 0.3 to 0.5 (Holt and Laury 2002).
As for this belief expected payos for aFM = c exceed those for aFM = d by only about 1 percent,
small decision errors are an alternative explanation. So, overall, this is strong evidence in favor of
best-response behavior.
Probit regressions on the aFM decisions can further add to this point. Using stated beliefs as
explanatory variable, specication (E1) in Table 5 shows that the variable belief is signicant (at
15Elicit Beliefs True Distribution





































Observations 60 60 60 60
LR 2(1) 45.64 45.72 15.46 18.94
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pseudo R2 0.55 0.55 0.19 0.23
Dependent variable: rst-mover cooperation (a
FM
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: stated belief about the number of second-mover cooperators i faces.
# a
SM
 i = c: feedback about the true number of second-mover cooperators i faces.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * and *** indicate signicance at the 10%- and 1%-level, respectively.
Table 5: Probit regressions.
16p < 0:001) in Elicit Beliefs. The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the result: the smooth black line
is derived from specication (E1) and superimposed over the actual frequency of aFM = c choices
for a given stated belief about the number of aSM = c players in the session. The sharp increase in
rst-mover cooperation rates for a belief of four or larger is consistent with selsh expected utility
maximization.
Finally, how accurate are stated beliefs? Only seven (12%) of the subjects actually scored a
perfect guess (that is, their belief was equal to the correct number of aSM = c players in their
session). Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, the belief distribution is spread out over the whole admissible
range. But we saw that this is not just noise, as second-mover choice and beliefs are highly correlated.
So the variation in beliefs to a large part arises because they are biased toward subjects' own aSM
choices. To sum up our ndings on Elicit Beliefs:
Result 2 In Elicit Beliefs, the rst and second move are positively correlated. Subjects almost
always best respond to their belief, but beliefs are biased toward subjects' own second-mover choices.
4.4 The True Distribution treatment
In the previous section, we saw that rst- and second-mover cooperation are strongly correlated.
We also observed that subjects tend to best respond to their beliefs, but that beliefs are biased,
which is consistent with a consensus-eect based explanation for this correlation. As illustrated in
Figure 1, True Distribution removes the impact of the consensus eect on beliefs. A subject knows
the true number of aSM = c players she faces before making her rst-mover choice. Accordingly,
this treatment reveals whether rst-mover decisions can be explained as best responses to beliefs,
or whether the direct channel described in Figure 1 also operates.
Are subjects best responding to the feedback in True Distribution? The majority of rst movers
do: 38 (63.3%) pick the risk neutral best response. Of the remaining 22 subjects, 10 got a feedback
of four and do not cooperate, which again can be explained by risk aversion.
To test whether the direct channel operates, we analyze the correlation of rst and second moves,
while controlling for the feedback regarding the second moves.13 This is what the probit regressions
13Looking only at the correlation of moves can lead to wrong conclusions in True Distribution. In particular, if there
was a correlation of decisions at the treatment level here, this would not necessarily indicate a failure of subjects to
best respond to the feedback we provide. To see this, imagine two experimental sessions. Suppose that every subject
defects as second mover in the rst session and every subject cooperates in the second session. Now, if all subjects
best responded to the feedback they received before making their rst-mover choice, a test using the data from both















Figure 4: Illustration of probit regressions
18in Table 5 do. Specication (T1) is an intermediate step which regresses rst-mover choices only
on the feedback about the exact number of second-mover cooperators that subject i faces in her
session (# aSM
 i = c). In specication (T2), we then add as explanatory variable a dummy for the
subject's own second-mover decision (cooperation: aSM
i = 1, defection: aSM
i = 0).
The correlation of rst and second move prevails even with the feedback given in
True Distribution: the coecient of aSM
i in specication (T2) is signicant (p = 0:063). Moreover,
adding the subject's own second-mover choice also improves the pseudo R2 compared to speci-
cation (T1) (in the corresponding OLS regression the adjusted R2 increases from 0.23 to 0.27).
So, overall, even when we give accurate feedback about second-mover cooperation rates, there still
remains a bias toward a player's own type (cooperator or defector).14
Figure 5 illustrates the predicted cooperation rates of aSM = c and aSM = d players, respectively,
based on specication (T2). The dierences are quantitatively substantial: in the range of feedback
of two to eight that we observe in the data, a second-mover cooperator is between three and seven
percentage points more likely to cooperate as rst mover than a second-mover defector.
Result 3 In True Distribution, although most subjects best respond to the feedback, the rst and
second move are still positively correlated (when we control for the feedback).
4.5 Discussion
Comparing the Elicit Beliefs and the True Distribution data, we note two ndings that are rel-
evant for our research question. First, in True Distribution, a positive correlation between rst-
and second-mover decisions remains even after conditioning on feedback. This suggests that the
correlations found in previous experiments (where such feedback was not given) are not driven ex-
clusively by a consensus eect. This is also consistent with the positive coecient of the subject's
own second-mover choice in the probit specication (E2) for Elicit Beliefs in Table 5, although this
coecient is small and insignicant.15
the feedback. A better indicator would be the correlation of choices at the session level but, with only ten participants
per session, we have too few observations to make meaningful statements.
14This bias is also seen when we consider the 22 subjects who do not play the risk-neutral best response to the
feedback. Among these, 16 choose the same action as rst and second mover. In particular, among the seven subjects
who choose a
FM = C even though a
FM = D is the best response, ve have chosen a
SM = C, which could be an
indication that these subjects have a strong preference to cooperate in either role.
15Collinearity between the belief and the second-mover decision resulting from the consensus eect is partly respon-











Figure 5: Dierence in rst-mover cooperation rates between second-mover cooperators and second-
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Figure 6: Impact of beliefs/feedback on rst-mover cooperation rates
20Second, even though best-response behavior in True Distribution is frequent (63.3 percent of
rst-mover choices, 80 percent if we allow for a small amount of risk aversion), the rate is somewhat
below that in Elicit Beliefs (where 83.3 percent or 93.3 percent best respond, respectively). This
dierence is signicant (2 = 5:156; d:f: = 1; p = 0:023 if we only consider risk-neutral best
responses, and 2 = 3:534; d:f: = 1; p = 0:060 otherwise).
The latter nding is consistent with the pattern shown in Figure 6, that subjects respond more
strongly to their own belief in Elicit Belief than to the feedback given in True Distribution. The
gure plots the marginal eects from probit specications (E2) and (T2) in Table 5. As one can
see, over most of the range the marginal eect of belief in Elicit Beliefs is much bigger than that
of feedback about the number of second-mover cooperators in True Distribution (recall, that we
actually only observe feedback values between two and eight). Similarly, the comparison of the top
and bottom panels in Figure 4 illustrates this stronger reaction to beliefs in Elicit Belief. While the
above regression-based results need to be taken with a grain of salt because of potential collinearity
(see Footnote 15), the bottom panel in Figure 4 does reveal that in True Distribution a share of
subjects cooperate as rst movers even when defection is the risk-neutral best response (that is,
when feedback is less than four). This never happens in Elicit Belief, as the top panel shows.
We can make sense of the above ndings as follows. We know that the belief is highly correlated
with the subject's own second-mover choice in Elicit Beliefs. Because of this correlation, and the
fact that our direct measure of second-mover preferences is a binary choice, the belief of a subject
can partly capture the intensity of her preferences. So people with strong preferences will have
strong beliefs and a clear best response as rst mover, which in turn agrees with their preference
for cooperation or defection. As a result, in Elicit Beliefs, a strong eect of preferences on the
rst-mover decision via the direct channel in Figure 1 cannot be distinguished from a strong eect
through the indirect channel.
As True Distribution removes the link between beliefs and preferences, the signicant aSM coef-
cient suggests that the direct channel is also, to some extent, responsible for rst-mover decisions.
This cannot be detected in Elicit Beliefs, in contrast, because the direct channel can dominate
the indirect one only for subjects with strong preferences for or against cooperation, but for these
subjects the prediction via the direct channel will agree with that of the indirect channel.
This suggests an important caveat when interpreting data from social dilemma experiments. Even
if regression results seem to attribute the correlation of rst- and second-mover choices completely
is precisely what requires a design like True Distribution.
21to a consensus eect, this may in fact not be the right conclusion. The direct link between choices
and preferences may just be hidden because the constrained set of choices does not fully reect
the intensity of preferences. Moreover, separate identication of a direct and indirect channel
is problematic because of potential collinearity between second-mover decision and beliefs arising
from the consensus eect. Our True Distribution treatment circumvents this problem and allows
for separate identication.
From treatment True Distribution we further infer that combining the inequality aversion models
of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (1999), or the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) with a consensus eect cannot provide a rationalization for all our results.
Such combined models could rationalize the results in Baseline and Elicit Beliefs, as the preference
element can capture the second-mover cooperation and the consensus eect the correlation between
rst- and second-mover cooperation. But all these models predict a negative correlation, or no
correlation between rst- and second-mover cooperation when beliefs are exogenously imposed as
in True Distribution { contrary to the positive correlation we nd.
As our nal point, if subjects are prone to a consensus eect, this should also show up in the
beliefs about rst-mover choices that we elicit at the end of True Distribution and Baseline. Indeed,
we nd signicant correlations of own rst-mover choice and the belief about the other subjects'
rst-mover choices in Baseline (rank biserial correlation rrb = 0:414; t = 2:802; p < 0:001) and
True Distribution (rank biserial correlation rrb = 0:531; t = 4:767; p < 0:001).
5 Conclusion
The starting point of our paper is the recent nding from sequential social dilemma experiments
with within-subject designs, that subjects who defect as rst movers are more likely to exploit rst-
mover cooperation in their second-mover choice, whereas those who cooperate as rst movers are
more likely to reciprocate rst-mover cooperation. Possible explanations for the positive correlation
of rst- and second-mover decisions fall into two camps. One predicts an indirect link between
preferences and rst-mover decisions based on a consensus eect, according to which people think
others behave similarly as they do and best respond to these beliefs. The other predicts a direct
link between decisions based on some underlying (social) preference { a channel that should operate
even if beliefs are held xed.
To explore whether the direct or indirect channel, or both, are driving the correlation between
rst- and second-mover decisions, we run three treatments of a sequential prisoner's dilemma ex-
22periment. In our baseline treatment, subjects choose in both roles. In a second treatment, we
additionally elicit rst-order beliefs relevant for the rst-mover decision. In line with previous ex-
periments, we observe a strong correlation of the two moves, no matter whether we elicit beliefs
or not. Elicited beliefs, too, are strongly correlated with both moves. This supports the view that
the relationship between rst- and second-mover decisions operates through the indirect channel
via a consensus eect. While this result is in line with a number of recent studies in similar games,
it is in conict with traditional views that (at least implicitly) consider beliefs and preferences as
independent.
In order to investigate whether the correlation between rst- and second-mover decisions is
completely driven by this indirect channel, we isolate the possible direct channel by eliminating the
indirect channel. This is done in our third treatment, where we give as feedback the actual frequency
of second-mover cooperators, before subjects decide their rst move. The correlation of the rst-
and second-mover decisions prevails in this treatment. This suggests that the correlation found
in the other treatments and previous experiments is not exclusively driven by a consensus eect,
but that there also is an underlying non-belief based motive aecting both second- and rst-mover
choices. We discuss a number of social preference theories that would provide a preference-based
explanation for the correlation of rst- and second-mover cooperation, such as rule consequentialism
(Kranz 2009), a mixture of total surplus and maximin preferences with concern withdrawal for
defecting rst movers (Charness and Rabin 2002), or reciprocal altruism (Levine 1998).
A lesson from our experiment is that the consensus eect seems to play a major role for the
observed behavior in social dilemmas. It should therefore receive more attention in behavioral
economic theory. Nevertheless, our ndings suggest that the direct channel also has a role to play,
and that it is actually worth to incorporate this channel into models and to further investigate the
precise forces at work empirically.
Indeed, the relationship between rst- and second-mover behavior as well as beliefs is complex,
as has become clear from recent studies using a variety of approaches, including classical laboratory
experiments, survey studies, eld experiments and physiological studies. In line with our results,
studies on trust games, which are structurally similar to our prisoner's dilemma, have shown that
the decision to trust is not only determined by beliefs and risk attitudes.16 See Fehr (2009) for an
16A number of studies have identied that, while risk attitudes do matter for the trust decision (as expected),
their role appears to be smaller than one might have thought. For example, in Ashraf et al. (2006) demographic
characteristics and risk attitudes account for only 15 percent of the total variation observed in trust behavior. But
adding beliefs, this gure increases to 58 percent. Similarly, Fehr (2009) nds in the survey data of Naef et al. (2008)
23extensive review and discussion of this issue. For example, Bohnet et al. (2008) elicit in a binary
trust game the minimal return probability that rst movers require in order to trust. They nd
that this is higher than in a game where the decision to return is not made by a second mover, but
by a random device. The results suggest that the trust decision is not just driven by beliefs and risk
aversion, but also by betrayal aversion. Similarly, Kosfeld et al. (2005) nd that administration of
the hormone oxytocin signicantly increases rst-mover trust rates, but that it neither inuences
risk taking nor beliefs. Interestingly, oxytocin has no impact on trustworthiness either. So their
study suggests that a missing element for explaining the rst move in the trust game could be an
additional preference element driving trust but not trustworthiness. In other words, while trust and
trustworthiness are strongly correlated in our and other studies, trust cannot be perfectly predicted
by trustworthiness and beliefs alone.
Further evidence suggesting that those elements of preferences which aect rst-mover behavior
in social dilemmas do not perfectly overlap with those that aect second-mover behavior comes from
Naef et al. (2008) and Fehr (2009). Based on the same data source, their results document that risk
aversion and betrayal aversion (which are survey-measured here) aect rst-mover behavior in a
trust game, but not beliefs regarding trustworthiness. This shows, once more, that rst-mover trust
is not only driven by beliefs. Furthermore, the absence of an eect on beliefs suggests that these
measures pick up elements of preferences that only aect rst-, but not second-mover behavior, and
for this reason do not inuence beliefs via a consensus eect.
Taking our study and those discussed above together, the following picture emerges. The rst-
mover decision is to a large extent driven by beliefs (that are themselves aected by preferences
through a consensus eect), but beliefs do not completely explain the rst-mover choice. Social
preferences and risk preferences also matter. Furthermore, some preference aspects appear to yield
a general tendency to cooperate in either role, while others only aect behavior in one of the roles.
Recent studies, including ours, have contributed to a much clearer, though far from conclusive
understanding of the complex interactions among these elements.
a stronger impact of betrayal aversion on trust measures than of risk aversion.
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A Experimental Instructions
A.1 Instructions for Elicit Beliefs
As described in Section 2.1, we conducted two variants of Elicit Beliefs to test for hedging confounds.
In Variant 1 (three sessions) we pay for both the decisions and the beliefs, whereas in Variant 2 (the
remaining three sessions), we pay for either the belief or the decision (both with equal probability).
You are now taking part in an experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, you
can, depending on your and other participants' decisions, earn a considerable amount of money.
It is therefore important that you take your time to understand the instructions. Please do not
communicate with the other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand and ask us. All the information you provide will be treated anonymously.
At the end of the experiment your earnings will be converted from Experimental Currency Units
(ECU) to Pounds Sterling at a rate of [Variant 1: ECU 2 = $1/ Variant 2: ECU 1 = $1], and
paid to you in cash. Your earnings will also be treated condentially.
Situation underlying the experiment: We start by explaining the situation underlying the
experiment, which is represented in Figure 1 [corresponds to Figure 2 in this paper, but with the
neutral frame labels]. There are two people involved, Person A and Person B. Person A can choose
between two options: IN or OUT. If Person A picks OUT, Person B has no choice to make, and
both Person A and B get ECU 10 each. If Person A picks IN, Person B then has a choice between
two options: LEFT or RIGHT. If LEFT is chosen, both Person A and B get ECU 14 each. If
RIGHT is chosen, Person A gets ECU 7 and Person B gets ECU 17.
Overview of the experiment: The experiment consists of three parts. You and the other
participants will each make decisions both in the role of Person A and of Person B. Additionally,
we will ask you to make a guess how the other participants in the room decided. At the end of
the experiment, the computer will randomly assign you either the role of Person A or the role of
Person B, and will also randomly match you and the other participants in pairs. Note that you will
have to make your decisions without knowing the role that you will ultimately be assigned. Also,
at the time when you make your decisions, you will not know the decision made by the participant
matched to you. Below, we will explain how your payment from the experiment is determined. But
let us rst have a closer look at your tasks in the order that they will appear.
1. Decision Task B: You have the role of Person B in the situation described in Figure 1. Given
29that Person A chose IN: Do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
2. Guess Task: There are 10 participants in the room, you and 9 other participants. All of them
also did the above Decision Task B. How many of the 9 other participants do you think chose
LEFT?
3. Decision Task A: Now you have the role of Person A. Do you choose IN or OUT?
Payments: [Variant 1: At the end of the experiment you will be paid both for the Decision
Tasks and for the Guess Task. Your overall payo will be converted at a rate of ECU 2 = $1.
Payos for the individual tasks are determined as follows.
Payo for the Decision Tasks: As mentioned,...]
[Variant 2: At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly decide whether your
payment will be based on the Decision Tasks or the Guess Task. Each type of tasks is equally likely
to be the one determining your payo, and will be the same for all subjects. (This means whenever
you are paid based on the Decision Tasks, also all other participants are paid based on the Decision
Tasks; and whenever you are paid for the Guess Task, this is also the case for all other participants.)
Your overall payo will be converted at a rate of ECU 1 = $1. Depending on the random draw of
the computer, payos are determined as follows.
Payo if the random draw of the computer selects the Decision Tasks: As mentioned,] the com-
puter will randomly and anonymously pair you with another participant in the room. One of you
will randomly be assigned the role of Person A, and the other one will be assigned the role of Person
B. The computer will then take your and the other participant's relevant Decision Task choices to
compute your payos as shown in Figure 1.
[Variant 1: Payo for the Guess Task: In addition to the payo for the Decision Tasks, you
receive a payo for the Guess Task, which depends...]
[Variant 2: Payo if the random draw of the computer selects the Guess Task: The payo for
the Guess Task depends] on the accuracy of your guess. The better your guess, the higher will be
your payo. Take a look at Table 1 (on a separate page) [corresponds to Table 2 in this paper, but
with the neutral frame labels]. The table shows how your guess and the actual choices of the other
participants determine your payo.
 You can see that a perfect guess earns you ECU 15. For example, if your guess was 6, and if
there are actually 6 people who chose LEFT in Decision Task B, you get ECU 15.
30 If your guess is completely o the mark you earn nothing. This occurs if you guess that 9
other participants chose LEFT, while none of them did so; or if you guess that none of the
other participants chose LEFT, while all of them did so.
 Otherwise, your payo depends on how close to accurate your guess was. For example, if 6
out of the other 9 participants chose LEFT, and your guess was that 3 participants would do
so, you earn ECU 13.30.
Before starting with the actual experiment, we will ask you to answer a few control questions. Then
we will go through the three parts of the experiment. There will be plenty of time before each
decision to ask questions. At the end of the experiment we ask you to answer a few questions.
These answers will not aect your nal payment.
Are there any questions? If so, please raise your hand.
A.2 Instructions for Baseline
The instructions are the same as in Elicit Beliefs (Variant 2), except that the Guess Task (included
only to achieve balanced designs) now comes last, and asks about the rst-mover decisions of the
other participants:
1. Decision Task B: You have the role of Person B in the situation described in Figure 1. Given
that Person A chose IN: Do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
2. Decision Task A: Now you have the role of Person A. Do you choose IN or OUT?
3. Guess Task: There are 10 participants in the room, you and 9 other participants. All of them
also did the above Decision Task A. How many of the 9 other participants do you think chose
IN?
A.3 Instructions for True Distribution
The instructions are the same as in Baseline, except that after Decision Task B there is feedback
about the second-mover decisions of the other participants:
1. Decision Task B: You have the role of Person B in the situation described in Figure 1. Given
that Person A chose IN: Do you choose LEFT or RIGHT?
31The decision task is followed by a feedback stage. There are 10 participants in the room, you
and 9 other participants. All of them also did the above Decision Task B. The feedback stage
informs you about how many of the 9 other participants chose LEFT in Decision Task B.
2. Decision Task A: ...
B Oral Summaries
B.1 Oral Summary for Elicit Beliefs
Welcome to the experiment. Please do not communicate with the other participants during the
experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and ask us. At your seat you will
nd a set of instructions. Read them carefully now. Please answer the questions you nd on a
separate page and raise your hand if you are nished. Before the experiment starts we will give a
brief summary.
After instructions were read, before Decision Task B: To summarize: Please look at Figure 1
in the instructions. The experiment starts with Decision Task B. Next will be the Guess Task,
and nally we come to Decision Task A. You will have to do each task only once. We will briey
summarize the tasks when we get to them.
[Variant 2: At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly decide for all participants
whether the Decision Tasks are going to be the basis for payments, or the Guess task.]
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly matches you with one of the other par-
ticipants in the room. One of you will be assigned the role of Person A and the other that of
Person B | both roles are equally likely. [Variant 1: The payos for the Decision Tasks will then
be computed based on your and the other participant's choices in the relevant Decision Tasks. In
addition, the Guess task will be paid. The whole amount will then be converted to Pounds Sterling
at a rate of 2 ECU = $1/ Variant 2: If the Decision tasks will be the basis for payments, the
payos will then be computed based on your and the other participant's choices in the relevant
Decision tasks. Otherwise, the Guess task will be paid. The payo amount will then be converted
to Pounds Sterling at a rate of 1 ECU = $1.]
We start with Decision Task B. You are asked to make a choice between LEFT and RIGHT for
the case that you are assigned the role of Person B and Person A chose IN before. If you choose
LEFT, both you and the other participant matched to you will get 14 ECU. If you choose RIGHT,
you get 17 ECU and the other participant 7 ECU. Note that you will learn your actual role only
32at the end of the experiment. Also, if you actually are assigned the role of Person B you will learn
Person A's actual choice only at the end of the experiment. [Variant 2: You will also learn only at
the end of the experiment whether the Decision Tasks or the Guess Task will determine the payos.]
Are there any questions?
Between Decision Task B and Guess Task: We now come to the Guess Task. You are asked to
guess how many of the 9 other participants in the room chose LEFT in the Decision Task B. Have a
look at Table 1. It shows how your guess and the actual choices of the other participants determine
your payo. Also, go through the examples given in the instructions (p.3 bottom).
Are there any questions?
Between Guess Task and Decision Task A: We now come to Decision Task A. You are asked to
make a choice between IN and OUT for the case that you are assigned the role of Person A. If you
choose IN, your payo and that of the other participant matched to you in the role of Person B
depend on the choice between LEFT and RIGHT of that participant, as described in Figure 1. If
you choose OUT, both of you receive 10 ECU, and the choice of the other participant matched to
you is irrelevant for payos. Again, you learn your actual role only at the end of the experiment.
Are there any questions?
B.2 Oral Summary for Baseline
The summary is the same as in Elicit Beliefs (Variant 2), except that the Guess Task now comes
last, and asks about the rst-mover decisions of the other participants.
B.3 Oral Summary for True Distribution
The summary is the same as in Baseline, except that there is an additional Feedback Stage after
Decision Task B:
Between Decision Task B and Feedback Stage:
All participants in the room did the above Decision Task B. Now you are informed about how
many of the 9 other participants in the room chose LEFT in Decision Task B.
Note that if you are assigned the role of Person A, one of these 9 choices is the choice of the
person you will be matched with. This means, for example, that if the information is that 9 out
of 9 chose LEFT, then you know for sure that you would be matched with a Person B who chose
LEFT. So if you chose IN, you would get 14 ECU. If the information is that 0 out 9 chose LEFT,
then you know for sure that you would be matched with a Person B who chose RIGHT. In this
case, if you chose IN, you would get 7 ECU. As a third example, suppose that the information is
33that 6 out of 9 chose LEFT. This means that there is a 2 in 3 chance that you would be matched
with a Person B who chose LEFT (and you would get 14 ECU if you chose IN), while there is a 1
in 3 chance that you would be matched with a Person B who chose RIGHT (and you would get 7
ECU if you chose IN).
Are there any questions?
Between Feedback Stage and Decision Task A: ...
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